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PLURALITIES OF JUSTICE, MODALITIES OF PEACE:
THE ROLE OF LAW(S) IN A PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI
ACCOMMODATION
Perry Dane*
Among the great slogans of street politics is "No justice! No peace!"
John Quigley's contribution to this journal's recent symposium on "The
Legal Foundations of Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East ' 1 does not
quite take up this motto. Quigley speaks a more specialized language than
the street marcher, so his credo is closer to "No law! No peace!" He also
stands in a more complex relation to officialdom. Though he pickets
outside the gates of the official Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, he claims
the imprimatur of the established international community. Nevertheless,
Quigley's thesis parallels the demonstrator's chant in its structure. Both
try to intertwine a normative argument with an acid warning.
Quigley's normative argument is that the current Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations threaten to "violate rights on the Palestinian side" 2 on such
issues as borders, settlements, displaced persons, and Jerusalem. Quigley
admits that negotiations must look to what is "politically feasible."3 But
he claims that the stance of the Palestinians is so close to the demands of
international law, and the stance of Israel so at variance with that law, that
just letting the parties compromise their differences, without the
facilitating hand of the organs of the international community, would
violate "legal principle ' 4 and fail to vindicate legitimate Palestinian
interests.
Quigley's warning is that a "non-law based"5 agreement - which is to
say one that did not include Israeli withdrawal from essentially the entire
West Bank and Gaza, and at least portions of Jerusalem, the dismantling
of Israeli settlements, and repatriation of the Palestinian diaspora- would
leave unacknowledged Palestinian rights festering. Palestinians could still
raise their rightful claims, and "the United Nations would face a choice
between following legal principle, or following the PLO-Israeli
agreement."6 More to the point, Palestinians angered by the failure of the
* Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Development, Rutgers School of Law -
Camden.
1 John Quigley, The Role of Law in a Palestinian-sraeliAccommodation, 31 CASEW. REs.
J. INTL L. 351 (1999).
2 Id. at 352.
3 Id. at 351,373.
4 Id. at 377.
5 Id. at 376.
6 Id. at 377.
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agreement to vindicate their rights, could resort to violence,7 presumably
threatening not only Israel but also the Palestinian leadership and world
community that allegedly betrayed them.
Each of the two intertwined strands of Quigley' s argument could be
challenged on its own terms. Regarding his normative claims, an
alternative story would go something like this:8 Israel was attacked in
1948, at the moment of its birth, by an Arab world that rejected the
United Nations effort to partition mandatory Palestine into Jewish and
Arab states. From 1948 to 1967, Jordan occupied the West Bank and the
eastern part of Jerusalem, and Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip. Neither of
these Arab states tried to beget an Arab Palestinian state in those
territories. In 1967, faced with mortal threats from its neighbors, Israel
fought a war and, among other things, captured the West Bank, eastern
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. As the only state successor to mandatory
Palestine, Israel arguably has a better claim than any other entity to those
territories, though it is willing to negotiate away most of those lands in
return for peace. During the 1948 war, many Palestinian Arabs left Israel,
some willingly. But an approximately equal number of Jews were
expelled from Arab lands, and were absorbed at great cost by the new
Israeli state. Palestinians might have a right of "self-determination." But
vindicating that right does not necessarily require a state with a particular
set of borders and political arrangements. In light of all this, Quigley's
absolutist and intense positions on borders, settlements, displaced
persons, and Jerusalem are, at the least, debatable as a matter of
international law.
Even if Quigley's view of international law were correct, his
practical analysis would be incomplete. The fact is that even the most
dovish Israeli government could not go as far as Quigley demands. The
reason is partly political. But it also reflects realistic concern for Israel's
security. Thus, even on Quigley's terms, the choice is not between a good
accord and a flawed one, but between a flawed accord and none at all.
7 See id at 352.
8 See generally JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS
(1981); ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY PLACES (1980); Michael Curtis,
International Law and the Territories, 32HARV. INT'LL.J. 457 (1991); Allan Gerson, Trustee-
Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1
(1973); Malvina Halberstam, Self-Determination in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Meaning, Myth,
and Politics, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 465 (1989); Eugene V. Rostow, Palestinian Self-
Determination: Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5
YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 147 (1979); Stephen M. Schwebel, What Weight to
Conquest?, AM. J. INT'L L., 1970,344; Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections
on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REv. 279 (1968). I do not mean by citing
these various legal analyses more sympathetic to the Israeli position to endorse all their
arguments. The point is only to provide a counterweight to Quigley's account.
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Injecting international overseers, as Quigley urges, might only spur the
parties to posturing and brinkmanship, not promote a better result.
More telling, Quigley ignores the moral courage of the present Israeli
government, and of the Israeli majority that supports the peace process.
By seriously bargaining with the Palestinians, Israelis are knowingly
risking their existence. If they concede too little, they chance failure in the
talks. Quigley might also be right that if they concede enough to reach a
pact, but no more, they invite Palestinian disenchantment and more
violence. Yet if they concede too much, they risk strategic vulnerabilities
that would tempt some Palestinians, or others, to set out to destroy Israel
for good. Even if that effort failed, its result would be terrible - for
Israelis, for Palestinians, and for the world. Nevertheless, Israelis are
venturing ahead, for the sake of peace, and justice.
Prudential arguments are most useful as prods, not alternatives, to
nuanced normative reasoning. But the willingness of both Israelis and
Palestinians to talk despite their grievances and misgivings suggests that
Quigley underrates the normative and practical appeal of peace. Peace is
not worth having at any price. But it is worth having at some, even high,
price. The United Nations charter enshrines both justice and peace as
goals, 9 and arguably gives peace the higher priority.10 Some of the very
norms that Quigley cites, such as the illegality of acquiring territory even
in a just war, reflect that tradeoff. 1" Sometimes, an "unjust peace is better
than a just war." 12 An imperfect agreement between Israel and the PLO
might move some dissidents to violence. But others, exhausted by war
and seeing the fruits of coexistence, might be moved to moderation.
9 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 3 ("all members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
are not endangered.").
10 See RICHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 42 (1986); see also ANTHONY
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT (1986); I. Pogany, Religion, the
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 93, 93-96 (Agd Bradney ed., 1992). For balanced appraisals of the respective roles
of peace and justice in modem international law, see, e.g., ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT
J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM
(1993); SHELDON M. COHEN, ARMS AND JUDGMENT: LAW, MORALITY, AND THE CONDUCT OF
WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 60-71 (1989); Sir Francis Vallat, The Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR
155 (1965).
1 See Bert V. A. R6ling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE
CURRENTLEGAL REGULATION OFTHE USE OFFORCE 3 (A. Casseseed., 1986); Vallat, supra note
10.
12 I have seen this aphorism attributed to Cicero. See, e.g., DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS at
736 (1968).
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I do not, however, want to spend most of the few pages allowed to
me debating Professor Quigley head on. Instead, I want to scout out
another perspective. The Middle East conflict involves not only two
peoples, but also at least two normative landscapes, vying in the same
space. This suggests the utility of a "legal pluralist" approach to the
problem.13 Legal pluralism is both a thesis about the nature of law and
norms, and a methodology of discourse. If Professor Quigley sees in the
present negotiations a terrible tension between "law" and desire, then
both the thesis and the discourse of legal pluralism could illuminate how
that tension might be eased.
Legal pluralism, at its core, is the proposition that nation-states do
not hold a monopoly on the creation or articulation of law. Religious
groups, indigenous peoples, economic actors, the denizens of cyberspace,
and other forms of community can, under appropriate circumstances,
possess a law of their own that other legal systems should at least
acknowledge. Legal pluralism, at its best, appreciates the often-
constructed character of identity, and the provisional, fleeting, aspects of
normative system-building. But it treasures such fluidity, and in any event
emphasizes the similarly contingent character, in the larger sweep of
things, of the system of nation-states.
In one important sense, the role of international law today is itself an
affirmation of legal pluralism, in that it challenges the crudest forms of
state exclusivism. But to the extent that international law becomes
monistic, one-dimensional, and imperial, it simply reduces to a variation
on state exclusivism, if one notch higher in lexical order. 14
Consider, for example, Professor Quigley's discussion of the legal
status of Jerusalem. Quigley can find no colorable basis law for Israel's
claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem - not only the Eastern part captured
in 1967, but even the Western part held since 1948.15 But if this is true in
international law, which I doubt,16 that only speaks to the insufficiency of
that law. Can it be irrelevant that Jerusalem was the capital of the Jewish
13 See Perry Dane, Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 959 (1991)
(presenting my own views on legal pluralism, and citations to some classic sources). For
valuable citations to recent discussions of legal pluralism in the specific context of international
relations, and its relation to the process of globalization, see Karsten Nowrot, Legal
Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations Under
International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579, 641-44 (1999).
14 Cf. SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996)
(rejecting the "single-value approach" to law in favor of the pluralistic approach of
polycentricity).
15 See Quigley, supra note 1, 371-73.
16 See generally LAUTERPACHT, supra note 8. See Ruth Lapidoth, Jerusalem - Some
Jurisprudential Aspects, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 671-76 (1996) (reviewing the range of
positions on Jerusalem's international legal status.
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Commonwealth until Roman legions overran it? Is it irrelevant that
Jewish law considers Jerusalem to be the holiest spot on Earth, that Jews
pray in the direction of Jerusalem, and that the text of those prayers
constantly refers to Jerusalem? 17 Is it irrelevant that, long before the dawn
of modem Jewish nationalism, Jews not only longed to return to
Jerusalem, but also braved great hardships to fulfill that longing, so that
for many centuries the city has included a Jewish presence? 18 Is it
irrelevant that Mount Zion, a hill in Jerusalem, became a metaphor for the
entire land of Israel, so that when secular Jewish nationalism did arise in
the nineteenth century, it called itself Zionism? Is it irrelevant that the
contemporary Israeli passion for Jerusalem - secular and religious -
enshrined in a Basic Law, 19 stems in part from the trauma of Jordanian
occupation of the Eastern part of the city, when barbed wire and no-man's
lands scarred the landscape, the Jewish Quarter of the Old City was razed,
and Jews were denied access to the Western Wall?20
For some, these would be clinching arguments. A genuine legal
pluralism, however, will not have it so easy. If the Jewish legal view of
Jerusalem is relevant, so are the Islamic legal view and the Christian
view.2 t If the normative map of Zionism is relevant, so is the normative
map of Palestinian nationalism. For that matter, we even need to take
seriously the considered stance of some Arabs, grounded in both
nationalist and Islamic presumptions, that the very existence of the State
of Israel is "a cancerous growth implanted in their body by the West. 22
A truly adventurous legal pluralism might take in even more angles.
Consider, for example, that Jerusalem is an ancient place, older than any
of the groups that claim it, with its own complex history. If, as some
argue, ordinary cities deserve more juridical dignity than statist legal
doctrine typically accords them,23 then Jerusalem deserves such dignity a
hundredfold. This might mean two different things. We might look to
Jerusalem as a polity - a present community of people. Or we might look
to Jerusalem as a cultural and legal entity in its own right, whose
17 See generally Stefan C. Reif, Jerusalem in Jewish Liturgy, in JERUSALEM: ITS SANCTrrY
AND CENTRALITY TO JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM 424 (Lee I. Levine, ed., 1999).
18 See YossIBEILIN, ISRAEL: A CONCISEPOLITICALHISTORY 13 (1992); C.H. DODD&M.E.
SALES, ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD 25 (1970)
19 Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 1980, 34 L.S.I. 209 (1979- 1980) (declaring that
"Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.").
20 See DAN KURzMAN, GENESIS 1948: THE FIRSTARAB-ISRAELI WAR 343-402 (1970).
21 Cf. Silvio Ferrari, The Religious Significance of Jerusalem in the Middle East Peace
Process: Some Legal Implications, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 733 (1996).
22 PETER MANSFIELD, A HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST at 346 (1991, Penguin ed. 1992).
2 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS (1999).
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legitimate interests reflect the entire sweep of its history and the larger
human communities that pray for its peace. 4 Law has treated Hindu idols
as legal persons whose own best interests determine who should have
custody of them.2 5 Lawyers have entertained the possibility of giving
standing to trees.26 According juridical dignity to a city is no more
far-fetched. Indeed, while the international regime for Jerusalem
contemplated in the United Nation's 1948 partition plan for the
Palestinian Mandate is no longer either practical or normatively
compelling, the instinct of specialness that helped motivate that plan is
surely still both.
Recognizing the juridical dignity of Jerusalem might not itself yield
determinate results. Both competing parties, after all, claim to speak on
the city's behalf, and finding an authoritative and objective guardian ad
litem would be hard. Nevertheless, the exercise is a useful thought
experiment, in that it puts a critical question - what is in the best interests
of Jerusalem? - on the table. At least, it might suggest that the physical
division of the city between 1948 and 1967 should be an object lesson,
not a baseline, for any future accommodation.
Legal pluralism invites us to loosen the bounds of legal discourse and
listen to a variety of contradictory voices, including voices we can only
imagine. But cataloging this variety cannot be the end of the matter.
Conflicting normative worlds necessarily encounter, and try to make
sense of, each other, and legal pluralism can help describe the terms of
such encounters.
Legal encounter occurs along many dimensions. It can be violent or
peaceful, solipsistic or accommodating. But particularly relevant to the
24 Cf Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation, and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291
(1999) (discussing intrinsic value of sites of cultural heritage, including Jerusalem).
25 Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, 52 L. R. I. A. 245 (1925) (Privy
Council case arising out of India).
26 See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAvE STANDING? TOwARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR
NATURAL OBJECTS (1972). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Stone's ideas, though they did not find their way directly into legal
doctrine, did help inspire the notion of an environmental ethics grounded in a pluralistic moral
and legal discourse. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR
MORAL PLURALISM (1987); Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for
Environmental Ethics, 24 ENvTL. L. 1 (1994). For an effort to extend these ideas explicitly to
the international law arena, see Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their
Emerging Right to Life, AM. J. INT'L L., Jan. 1991, 21.
27 See Adnan Abu Odeh, Religious Inclusion, Political Inclusion: Jerusalem as an
Undivided Capital, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 687 (1996) (presenting a particularly eloquent
meditation on the possibility of an undivided Jerusalem that meets the aspirations of both Jews
and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians, written by the former Jordanian permanent representative
to the United Nations).
[Vol.32:273
2000] LAWS IN A PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI ACCOMMODATION 279
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the possibility that the parties can make
some sense of each other's claims from within their own normative
worlds. It is vital in this conflict, as in others, to appreciate not only the
mutually exclusive possibilities in each side's normative claims, but also
the more generous strands of thought, and the intellectual and affective
resources, that might be available to bridge those contradictions.
Jewish law, for example, has available to it both pragmatic and
ethical arguments for supporting peaceful compromise with the
Palestinians, even at the cost of giving up control over lands that Jewish
law considers to be part of Israel's patrimony. Even the sacredness of
Jerusalem can serve the interest of accommodation: Under most views of
Jewish law, Jews may not set foot on most of the Temple Mount, the
contentious platform on which the First and Second Temples once stood,
and which is now home to Islam's Dome of the Rock.28
Meanwhile, secular Zionist ideology, despite its expansionist strains,
has its own logic, beyond the lure of peace, for accepting territorial
compromise: As current Israeli leaders have stressed, the "Jewish and
democratic" state of the Zionist dream would have to give up either its
Jewish or its democratic character if it kept territories occupied by large
numbers of non-Jews.
Arab and Islamic normative discourse has its own tools for pragmatic
and ethical accommodation. Indeed, in Islamic legal and political
thinking, the problem of Israel and Palestine is fundamental - the latest
instance of dilemmas of self-definition and encounter that go back many
hundreds of years.29 In early classical Islamic theory, polity and religion
fused. Moreover, the relationship between the international Islamic polity
and the non-Islamic world - known as the "realm of war" - was
inherently adversarial. As Islamic expansion ran into obstacles, however,
including the re-conquest of the Iberian Peninsula by Christian forces,
that theory of perpetual conflict had to accommodate the reality of an
encroaching non-Islamic world.3 ° Islamic jurists had to decide whether a
28 See Temple Mount Faithful v. Attorney General, H.C. 4185/90 (S.Ct. Israel Sept. 23,
1993), reprinted in 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 861, 906-909 (1996).
29 See generally MUHAMMAD ASAD, THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM
(Pap-Board Printers Ltd. 1986) (1961); CYRIL GLASSt, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OFISLAM
87 (Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 1989) (1989); MAJiD KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE
LAW OF ISLAM (1955); BERNARD Lnwvis, THE POLITICAL LANGUAGEOFISLAM (1991); Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im, Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and
Response, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.. 317 (1987); Christopher A. Ford, Siyar-ization and Its
Discontents: International Law and Islam's Constitutional Crisis, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 499
(1995); Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary
Relevance, in ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24 (J. Harris Proctor ed., 1965). My
summary here is obviously cursory in the extreme.
30 For a particularly interesting and theoretically illuminating account of that
accommodation in the work of one important medieval Islamic thinker, see Robert W. Cox,
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Moslem could, in good conscience, even live in a non-Islamic polity. And
they had to explain how Moslem governments could enter into ordinary
diplomatic and commercial relations with non-Islamic rulers. The solution
was to posit the possibility of an extended truce in which the inherent
state of war, while not abjured, was put in very long term abeyance.
Islamic jurists and theologians have over the centuries worked out the
practical and theoretical shape and limits of that truce in great detail.
Meanwhile, the classical view of Islamic polity also faced an internal
challenge.31 In principle, the realm of Islam is one religious-political
entity. While the original unity of the Islamic empire did not survive long
past the death of its founder, the various Islamic states, until at least the
end of the nineteenth century, each saw the others' as rebels and
pretenders to a universal mandate. Secular Arab nationalism has absorbed
the ideal of unity, so that the very existence of separate states is, by some
accounts, a bit of a scandal. Palestinian self-definition, in particular, has
felt this tension: Palestinian identity is closely tied to the aspirations and
ideology of a larger Arab movement. But if Palestinians are merely a
branch of the Arab nation, it is not clear why the principle of national
self-determination requires yet one more Arab state, in addition to the
twenty or so that already exist. The answer that Palestinians would give,
of course, is that they are a distinct people that is also a part of a larger
Arab whole, and that their struggle is consistent with the aspiration to
eventual Arab unity.32 This is, in fact, an answer consistent with the larger
vision, still held by some Moslems and Arabs, of a single polity divided
in practice into a multitude of entities that only the outside world
describes as distinct "nation-states." 33
Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of
Ibn Khaldun, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS
132 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
31 See generally BASSAM TIBI, GEORGIA AUGUSTA UNIVERSITY OF GOTrINGEN CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, ARAB NATIONALISM: BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE NATION-STATE (3rd ed.
1997); MALIK MUFTI, SOVEREIGN CREATIONS: PAN-ARABISM AND POLITICAL ORDER IN SYRIA
AND IRAQ (1996).
32 See THE PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW (Third Reading) (1998) (Palestine) translated by Saladin
A1-Jurf, reprinted in 31 CASEW. RES. J. INT'L L. 495, art. (1) (1999) (stating "Palestine is apart
of the Great Arab Homeland and the Palestinian Arab people are part of the Arab nation. Arab
unity is the goal towards which the Palestinian people are striving.")..
33 See Bassam Tibi, The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Order in the Middle East,
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. Winter-Spring 1999, 191, 191-92 (noting that in one view, "each of
the existing Arab states - nation-states by the definition of the international system - were
considered in Arabic to be a dawlah qitriyya (local state), not a dawlah qawmiyya (nation-state).
Underpinning this distinction is the belief that only the pan-Arab state encompassing all of the
Arab lands could be a real nation-state." ).
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In a deep sense, then, both the existing State of Israel and a possible
future State of Palestine challenge certain deep themes in Islamic and
secular Arab thinking. But it is surely an opening to accommodation to
realize that these are challenges of a sort that Arabs and Moslems have
been facing, and methodically and imaginatively working through for a
long time. For Palestinians situated in an Islamic or Arab normative
framework, peace with Israel might, from the view of eternity, be a
merely contingent, imperfect, concession to living with a "cancer," but in
one sense no more so than accommodation to the modern state system as
a whole. More affirmatively, the influence of Islamic thought can give
Palestinians a healthy skepticism about the ontological centrality of the
nation-state - any nation-state - and a more fluid sense of the relevance
of borders and political arrangements to any state's essential character.
3 5
I do not want to be a Pollyanna. If the normative vocabularies of both
Israelis and Palestinians allow for reconciliation, they also put up
obstacles to such reconciliation. Yet if an agreement does come, it will
surely have something to do with such internal normative moves. Even an
Israeli dove, for example, might bristle or even turn into a hawk, reading
Professor Quigley's dismissive, single-minded analysis. But an appeal to
Jewish, Zionist, or humanist values, along with a reasoned weighing of
the alternatives, and the psycho-political dynamics of the negotiating
process itself, might yield results that go at least some way to Quigley's
goals.
The potential of Jewish, Zionist, Islamic, and Arab nationalist
thought to understand the imperatives of encounter through their own
normative lenses suggests yet another theme in the discourse of legal
pluralism. We sometimes assume that peace and stability require
agreement on fundamental questions. As the philosopher Nicholas
Rescher points out, however, trying to shove the range of different
normative stances in the political and social world into an overarching
consensus is neither necessary for peace and stability, nor even always
desirable.36 All that is required is a certain amount of acquiescence and
tolerance by the competing factions.
When competing normative communities try to make sense of each
other's rights and claims, they do so through their own frames of
34 See David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law:
Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819 (1993) (providing an account of
Islamic theorists' struggle to make sense of the relationship between the state system and public
international law, on the one hand, and Islamic international jurisprudence on the other).
35 Cf. Cox, supra note 30, at 157 ("[T]he state in Muslim history never attained the absolute
claims accorded it in European history.... This is particularly significant at the present time,
when states, repositories of organized power, are perceived as intermediate between the telos of
Islamic peoples and the achievement of a reunified Islam.").
36 NICHOLAS RSCHER, PLURALISM: AGAINST THE DEMAND FOR CONSENSUS (1993).
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reference. As long as those perspectives can reach a modus vivendi, they
need not converge, or reach agreement on all points. Whatever the
outcome of the Israel-Palestinian talks, for example, Palestinians would
be entitled to see it as in some sense provisional and to continue to see the
entire land as their rightful patrimony, while pledging to forego force in
pursuit of that vision, and accepting the security structures necessary to
guarantee that pledge. Israelis, meanwhile, would be entitled to see the
entire land as Eretz Israel, their homeland, even if part of it was carved
out into a Palestinian state.
More profoundly, the possibility of this sort of double visioning can
itself yield some of the practical vocabulary for compromise. The most
promising proposals for a resolution to the conflict over Jerusalem, for
example, transcend the zero-sum language of sovereignty, 37 and, while
keeping the city united, imaginatively promote functional compromises
sensitive to each side's practical and ideological priorities. 38 In the end,
then, legal pluralism can be valuable, not only as a ground for claims, but
also as a resource for their adjudication and adjustment.
This essay's appeal to legal pluralism in the context of an
international conflict should have prompted several questions. Does
recognizing diverse normative worlds render impossible any judgment of
their conflicting claims? What is left for international law in this
pluralistic vision? And how can all this be made to work in the real life of
the world community?
37 Cf. Moshe Hirsch, The Future Negotiations over Jerusalem, Strategical Factors and
Game Theory, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 699, 712, 717 (stating "The basic structure of the dispute
between Israel and the Palestinians over Jerusalem has strong features of a zero-sum game.
The parties perceive the conflict over East Jerusalem chiefly as a territorial dispute. Each party
is interested in gaining full and exclusive sovereignty or control over all parts of the eastern
City. Needless to say, these preferences are bitterly opposed, as any gain for one party directly
entails a loss for the other.... [A]s long as the situation has the basic features of a zero-sum
game, the prospects for a compromise between Israel and the Palestinians is significantly
reduced." But those prospects might increase if the "game" can be expanded into geographical
or symbolic domains that do not have a zero-sum character.); Antonio F. Perez, Sovereignty,
Freedom, and Civil Society: Toward a New Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 851, 851 (1996)
(stating "much like today's system of states, the debate concerning sovereignty over Jerusalem
is a prisoner of the history of international law - a history that has been told in the language of
absolute and undivided sovereignty of the state.").
38 See, e.g., "Ze'ev Schiff, Beilin and Abu Mazen Drafted a Document on Final Status;
Agreed to Establish a Palestinian State," HA'ARETZ, Feb. 22, 1996, at I (discussing unofficial
paper outlining, inter alia, possible future arrangements for Jerusalem) on file with author;
MOSHE HIRSCH et al., WHITHER JERUSALEM? PROPOSALS AND POSITIONS CONCERNING THE
FUTURE OF JERUSALEM (1995); John V. Whitbeck, The Road to Peace Starts in Jerusalem: The
"Condominium" Solution, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 781 (1996); Perez, supra note 36; Adnan Abu
Odeh, Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem, 71 FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1992, at 183.
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All these questions, it seems to me, can be answered together. Legal
pluralism - like other forms of pluralism - does not imply relativism or
indifferentism. 39 None of us need to shirk from the duty of judgment,
even as we recognize that others have their own duty of judgment.
International law is especially important in the dynamic of judgment, not
as a "higher law," but as the principal legal discourse of the organized
international community.40 But a sensitive and open international law,
while not succumbing to relativism, will also accept its own need to make
sense of other legal conversations, of both states and other normative
communities.
In fact, international law in this century has been much more
dynamic and extemporaneous than Professor Quigley's sometimes flat
teleology seems to admit. Once conceived as mainly embracing relations
among states, international law has incorporated a concern for individual
rights. It has articulated a doctrine of self-determination of peoples, in
creative tension with its respect for state autonomy.41 It has begun to
appreciate a universal duty to the environment and global welfare. It has
reshaped the very notion of sovereignty, allowing for its functional
division in ways previously thought incoherent.42 It would be no great
leap for international law also to recognize the relevance of religious
claims and nation-constructing ideologies in its calculations of
international equity. Indeed, there is a good argument that, as relevant to
39 See HILARY PUTNAM, Pragmatism and Relativism: Universal Values and Traditional
Ways of Life, in WORDS AND LIFE 182, 192-96 (James Conant ed., 1994); RESCHER, supra note
35, at 117-26.
40 For an eloquent discussion of the interplay between internationalist and local normative
visions, see Nathaniel Berman, Legalizing Jerusalem or, Of Law, Fantasy, and Faith, 45 CATH.
U. L. REV. 823 (1996).
41 See generally MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993);
ANTONIO CASSESSE, SELF-DETERMINATION OFPEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995); HURST
HANNU , AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS (rev. ed. 1996); ERIC STEIN, CZECHO/SLOVAKIA: ETHNIC CONFLICT,
CONSTIrUTIONAL FISSURE, NEGOTIATED BREAKUP (1997); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-
Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); Edward M.
Morgan, The Imagery and Meaning of Self-Determination, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355
(1988); Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in Principle and Practice: The
Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience, COLUM. HUMAN RTS L. REV., Fall 1997, 91.
42 See generally J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing
Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INTL. ORG. 107 (1994);
Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The
Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 425 (1999);
Symposium, Theoretical Perspectives on the Transformation of Sovereignty, 88 AM. SOC'Y
INT'LL. PRoC. 1 (1994). See also Lapidoth, supra note 16, at 682-85 (discussing the relevance
of such developments, including the new concepts of functional sovereignty being used to
describe the law of the sea, to possible solutions of the Jerusalem problem).
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the Middle East conflict, it has already done so, beginning as far back as
the Palestine Mandate.
Even if a genuine legal pluralism does not find its way into the
doctrinal machinery of international law, it can become part of the
language of consensual bilateral and multilateral relations. That is where
the practical work of the current Israel-Palestinian talks comes in.
Professor Quigley's misgivings about the talks resemble the claim that
"alternative dispute resolution," whatever its attractions to the disputants,
disserves the legal order by sidetracking the vital work of publicly
articulating legal values.43 I understand that concern. I appreciate too that
the Israel-Palestinian talks are, in part, exercises in power and in
calculation. But the talks are also more than that. They are an occasion for
the parties to grope for the human and the conceptual bonds that can
overcome, without erasing, their differences. They are also the occasion
for each party to reexamine its own assumptions, and to re-imagine its
view of the other.
Simply comparing the results of Israel-Palestinian talks against a
preset legal yardstick is radically incomplete. The talks, potentially, can
themselves be a dynamic, if painful, setting for the articulation and
constitution of legal norms. They can, at their best, give rise to a juris-
generative moment, in which the clash of perceptions produces new
sparks of illumination.
At the end of the day, these sparks of illumination might help reshape
the substance of international law itself.44 From its earliest days, after all,
international law has been built, at least in part, on such dynamic,
on-the-fly, processes of articulation. Even if that does not happen, and
even if some analysts deem the results of the Israeli-Palestinian talks to be
illegitimate, the overall legal and political landscape will probably still, in
practice, make room for the peace and justice that the parties have
articulated for themselves.
All this brings us back to Quigley's most urgent practical warning:
that a Middle East accord that "does not accord with legal requirements ', 5
will foster disaffection and violence by Palestinians whose views and
claims remain unrepresented. It is precisely here, however, that legal
pluralism - whether or not you agree with my jurisprudence - reappears
as a fact on the ground. If some Palestinians do violently reject an
Israeli-Palestinian pact, it will probably have little to do with international
law. Even if Israel does have the better of the international law argument,
43 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
44 Cf. ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-66
(1971) (discussing circumstances under which bilateral and multilateral treaties can help define
the substantive content of "customary" international law); Anthony D'Amato, Custom and
Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1988) (same).
45 Quigley, supra note 1, at 374.
[Voi.32:273
2000] LAWS INA PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI ACCOMMODATION 285
some groups, such as Hamas, might still resist a settlement from within
their own view of Islamic law and politics. For that matter, even if an
agreement met Quigley's criteria for a just settlement that would not be
enough to satisfy dissenters who reject Israel's very existence.46
I said earlier that support for the compromises necessary to peace is
likely to arise out of the internal normative dynamics of each side to the
talks. If this is true for the natural supporters of compromise - the doves
and the moderates - it is even truer for its intuitive enemies. If there is
any hope that an Israel-Palestinian agreement will "stick 47 as against its
potential opponents, the source of that hope is in the deployment of
argument, authority, and political give-and-take by the supporters of the
accommodation. On the Palestinian side, one might hope that the creation
of a Palestinian state, however deficient in Palestinian eyes, will itself
change the normative dynamic, even for Hamas, and even for those who
continue to live outside Palestinian borders.
In sum, the point of any negotiating process is not only for the two
sides to make peace with each other, but for each side to make peace with
itself, or at least as much peace as necessary. If the history of other
negotiated conflicts is any guide, the lure for the critical mass of
supporters on both sides will, at the end of the day, not be justice alone,
or peace alone, but some combination of peace, justice, calculation,
fatigue, and faith.
46 Quigley deals with this sort of possibility obliquely, but only in the context of discussing
Israeli dissidents. Quigley, supra note 1, at 375.
47 Quigley, supra note 1, at 374.

